We haven't had too much in the news from the Middle East. The media must be getting bored of the constant grind. It is too everyday now. Once in a while there is a small outbreak that would have made alot of news. But the same old problems are festering and the factions are regrouping to make their move for power when the US Presidential elections start up in full force.
The following is from a summary in a British newspaper.

Fighting between Hamas and Fatah, the Palestinian National Authority's two dominant factions, has culminated with Hamas gaining control of the Gaza Strip. Fatah and Hamas, along with Israel, have strategic goals they will work to achieve in the days ahead.
The latest bout of intra-Palestinian fighting culminated June 15 in the Gaza Strip, where at least 200 Fatah police fled, the Egyptian diplomatic mission was evacuated, and Hamas forces gained de facto full security control.

Hamas and Fatah, the two dominant factions within the Palestinian National Authority, have been struggling for supremacy for years. Hamas is the newcomer, having been an Islamist militant organization that gradually eased into political life; it managed to take control of the government in elections in early 2006. Fatah, formed by the late Yasser Arafat, is the more established and secular of the two factions. Hamas has always been stronger in Gaza -- and Fatah stronger in the West Bank -- and now Hamas' control over Gaza is complete.

The political strategies and organizational quirks of all of the players in this drama are as complex as they are convoluted, but luckily, there are some clear points available for digestion. The three major players -- Hamas, Fatah, and Israel -- have their own sets of very clear strategic goals they will be working to achieve in the days ahead that will shape the political future of the southern Levant for years.

Hamas needs to achieve undeniable control over the Gaza Strip, which means a full purge of all Fatah security personnel -- and, by extension, a full seizure of control over all Palestinian facilities in the Gaza, particularly the security facilities. Fatah has long frustrated Hamas by using its presidential authority -- Fatah controls the presidency, Hamas the government -- to insert its own senior security personnel into the Hamas-dominated government. Hamas feels that once Fatah security personnel are removed from the Gaza Strip, the legitimacy and power of Hamas' military arm will be ensured and the faction can then choose whether it wants to follow a diplomatic or militant path. But first, Hamas must have unassailable control of its own domain.
Hamas must then establish independent lines of economic support. Neither the European Union nor the United States (much less Israel) will send a dime of financial support to a Hamas-run Gaza Strip seized by force of arms. Since Gaza is, in essence, a refugee camp with little to no local economy, Hamas must canvass the Islamic world for the state equivalent of welfare payments. The No. 1 donor will almost certainly be Iran.

Finally, Hamas must attempt to bolster its position -- both among the Palestinians and the international community -- but assert its influence beyond Gaza. That means it will try to seize control of a portion of the West Bank as well. It obviously is a difficult task, since the West Bank is Fatah's stronghold, but it is the next logical step if Hamas is to leverage its recent successes.

Fatah's game plan is much simpler. It will, of course, resist Hamas' final march to full victory in Gaza, but it knows that it's fighting a rear guard -- and ultimately futile -- battle. Any Hamas attempts to extend influence in the West Bank will, of course, be fought tooth and nail.

But Fatah will focus its efforts on the negotiating table. Every dollar sent to or statement of support for Hamas critically damages Fatah's domestic and international legitimacy, so Fatah must do everything possible to garner all international support for itself. This should not prove overly difficult; most Western states already oppose all things Hamas, and the end of the Hamas government should send a surge of long-delayed funding Fatah's way. The (perhaps impossible) trick will be convincing countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran that supporting Hamas is not in their interest.

Finally, there is Israel, which is thrilled to see the Palestinians fighting each other. After a bit of quiet celebration, the issue will be how to reinforce this new division by working with Fatah and Hamas.

Parallel efforts with Fatah will begin by seeking full political and financial isolation of Hamas and the Gaza Strip. If that can be achieved, the next step will be to seal Gaza off behind a barrier bearing a striking resemblance to the one that once graced Berlin. Any such barrier cannot be airtight because of the Gaza coastline, but security can be ratcheted up considerably.

But there is more in this development for Israel than killing the idea of a single Palestinian state; there also is the opportunity to fracture the Palestinians even further. The Israeli settlement and separation wall programs have aimed to fracture the West Bank into a half-dozen noncontiguous pieces in order to inhibit the creation of a unified Palestinian polity and economy.

All of these enclaves are Fatah-dominated, but if Hamas were to challenge Fatah's control in just one of them, Fatah's power in the West Bank -- and, with it, its international stature -- would at the very least be humiliatingly cracked. For Israel -- which controls the highways and byways connecting all of the West Bank enclaves -- that outcome is attractive enough to warrant some blind-eye-turning for Hamas' upcoming West Bank activities. The trick, of course, would be to make sure that any Hamas progress in the West Bank does not actually end with Hamas control. Israel would like to stir the pot and weaken Fatah and Hamas both, not empower Hamas with a West Bank enclave that could be used as a springboard for launching attacks into Israel proper.