This essay was written by silver analyst Theodore Butler, an independent consultant.

As of early March there was no surprise in the silver Commitment of Traders Report. The concentrated short positions of the largest 4 and 8 traders set new records, as the big shorts sold into the recent rally. The big 4 are now net short 62,229 contracts, or over 311 million ounces. That’s the equivalent of more than 177 days of world mine production. The eight largest traders are now net short 79,042 contracts, or more than 395 million ounces, or more than 225 days equivalent production. Never has there been a greater concentrated position of any type (long or short) in silver, or in any other commodity. If Nero were a commodity regulator, he would be fiddling while danger in the silver market burns out of control.
The shorts in silver and gold are up against the wall. Their collective open losses are of a magnitude many times greater than anything they have ever experienced in the past. In fact, it is my observation that these concentrated shorts have actually lost (on paper and in meeting resultant margin calls) more than they made in total over the past five or ten years. In silver, the big four shorts are out more than $1 billion in the past two weeks, and around $2 billion in the past two months. The big four gold shorts are out close to $3 billion in the past two months. Similar losses can be found in oil, natural gas, base metals, the grains, cotton and some other markets.
Who are these shorts that are being mauled? Generally, they are banks and financial institutions and large exchange member insiders who have traditionally inhabited the short side in most markets. They are the market makers.
What has caused this sudden and profound change of fortune for the shorts? Two things. One, the relentless demand for raw materials caused by world economic growth, primarily in the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China). Two, the influx of heavy commodity investment demand by institutions, primarily the index funds for now, but with the sovereign funds also showing interest.
The index funds, with some 200 billion dollars already invested, have bought a wide variety of commodities futures contracts, including crude oil, natural gas, wheat, soybeans, corn, cotton, sugar, coffee and base metals (mostly in London), among others. In gold and silver, the index funds buy primarily in the ETFs, instead of futures contracts. The index funds are blue-chip institutional money. These are long-term buy and hold positions and since there is no leverage, no margin call liquidation potential exists. (As contrasted to the tech funds who operate on margin.)
Last year, I first wrote about the index funds upon the initial release of the COT supplemental report which broke out the index funds’ holdings in various futures markets, "The Changing Of The Guard?"

The massive and non-leveraged buying by the index funds has leveled the playing field. Previously, the shorts dominated the markets, by financial strength and treachery, aided and abetted by the CFTC and the exchanges. The index funds have altered and evened the equation by sheer financial size and non-leveraged buying. For instance, the index funds are long one billion bushels of Chicago wheat futures, almost 50% of the net futures open interest and more than 50% of the US winter wheat crop.
It is the combination of tight supply/demand fundamentals in most commodities and institutional index fund buying that has pressed the short sellers up against the wall. Since these two factors appear to be long-term phenomena, any short-term sell-offs would offer only temporary respite to the shorts. It looks like the long-term bullish force of tight supply/demand and index buying is a paradigm shift of major significance.
Unfortunately for the shorts, the very nature of their commodity position has created a problem that may prove insurmountable for them. The positions that are going against them are very leveraged. These short positions are similar to the leveraged long positions currently being liquidated in mortgages, credit securities, derivatives and municipal bonds, by hedge funds and financial institutions. But all these securities and derivatives being marked down and liquidated are long positions, whereas the commodity positions under stress (including silver and gold) are very much short positions.
There is a world of difference between liquidating a leveraged long position in a panic and doing the same with a short position. The simple difference is this; a long position can’t go below zero, and at some price above zero, an opportunistic buyer will purchase the position. A short position being liquidated under panic conditions contains no such guarantee. Finding an entity willing to assume a massive short position if the shorts start to panic, is a world apart from dumping a long position.
There is no telling to how high a price a short liquidation (buying back) of a position might drive a price. For a commodity held short where no adequate supply exists to deliver against (think Minneapolis wheat and COMEX silver), the sky is truly the limit. Add in the fact that the COMEX silver short position is held in extremely concentrated hands (4 or less), and you have the ingredients for an historical short panic. This is precisely why the regulators have really dropped the ball in allowing this condition to persist and grow worse, in spite of my constant warnings.
I have written previously about the non-economic and illogical aspect to anyone shorting silver in great quantities at the super-depressed prices of the recent past. If you didn’t want to take advantage of the incredible opportunity that silver offered, fine. But why in the world would anyone want to short it big? At least we finally have the answer to that question. Shorting big was dumb. It was pure manipulation.
Is this the time for an epic short panic in silver? Perhaps, especially as more people recognize the problem. The combination of severe recent financial stress on the shorts, the fundamentals and index fund buying, combined with the impossibility of buying back the out-sized short position easily makes it a difficult situation for the shorts. A wounded animal is always dangerous, depending on how serious the wounds. They are up against a wall and, if not resolved soon, it is likely to fall on them.

Sam's comment: I believe the advice of Ted is early because he is looking at all the twigs instead of the forest.
His fundamentals are right but timing is everything. He promotes owning physical gold and silver so you don't have to worry about timing. Eventually the silver supply is smaller than the gold supply therefore the law of supply and demand will over rule the manipulation of the market by the big boys (the Shorts).
With this correction in the metals buy when it starts back up again and you will be rewarded.